Abstrucf-Conventionally, most network protocols assume that the network entities who participate in the network activities will always behave as instructed. However, in practice, most network entities will try to maximize their own benefits instead of altruistically contribute to the network by following the prescribed protocols, which is known a s selfih. Thus, new protocols should be designed for the non-cooperative network which is composed of selfish entities. In this paper, we specifically show how to design strategyproof multicast protocols for noncooperative networks such that these selfish entities will follow the protocols out of their own interests. By assuming that a group of receivers is willing to pay to receive the multicast service, we specifically give a general framework to decide whether it is possible, and how if possible to transform an existing multicast protocol to a strategyprwf multicast protocol* We then show how the payments to those relay entities are shared fair4 among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers, As a running example, we show how to design the strategyproof multicast protocol for the currently used core-based multicast structure. We SLO conduct extensive simulations to study the relations between payment and cost of the multicast structure.
Nisan and Ronen [l] studied the unicast routing problem in non-cooperative networks and introduced the idea of olgorithnric nrechanism design: they proposed to give the ASS some propcr payments to ensure that every AS conforms to the prescribed protocol regardless of all other ASS' behavior, which is known as strategyproof or tnithfirl. They designed the payment for unicast by using the VCG mechanism [21, 131, [4] , which is considered as one of the most positive results in algorithm mechanism design. Unfortunately, VCG mechanism has its own drawback. For multicast, if we want to apply VCG mechanism, the multicast tree should have the least cost among all trees spanning the receivers. However, finding the minimum cost multicast tree is known to be NP-Hard for both edge weighted networks [14], 11. 51 and node weighted networks [161, [17] . If we insist on applying the VCG mechanism to a multicast topology that does not have the minimal cost, VCG mechanism may fail 1181. Thus, some payment schemes other than VCG mechanism should be designed for multicast.
Recently, in 1181, the authors proposed several non-VCG strategy-proof payment schemes for several commonly used multicast trees. In this paper. instead of focusing on some specific multicast structures, we study whether it is possible to transform a multicast protocol based on any given multicast topology to a strategyproof multicast protocol, and if possible, how to design the strategyproof protocol.
Designing a truthful payment scheme is not the whole story for many practical applications. A natural question has to be answered is who will afford the payments. A simple solution is that the organization to which the receivers belong pays [MI. However, chis solution is not panacea. In many applications such as video streaming, often the individual receivers have to pay the relay agents to receive the data. How to charge the receiver far multicast transmission has been studied extensively in literatures [19] , 1201, [21 I . [22] . [23] , [24] . In most of their models, they assumed that 1) every receiver has a valuation for receiving the data and the receiver is selfish. 2) all relay agents are cooperative and reveal their me cost, and 3) the multicast tree is formed by the union of the shortest paths from the source to receivers. In the sharp contrast, in his paper, we also take the selfish behavior of the relay nodes (or links) into account. Thus, we model the network differently by assuming that I ) the relay agents are selfish, 2) the receivers always receive the data and pay what they "shouId" pay, and 3) the multicast topology could be any structure specified by some existing multicast protocols, including trees and meshes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to consider multicast pricing when the relay agents are non-cooperative. Notice that there is a possible work left for future exploration: what happens if both the receivers and relay agents are selfish and each receiver has a valuation and would receive the data if and only if its valuation is greater than what it needs to pay according to a strategyproof multicast prolocol.
One thing we should point out is that algorithmic mechanism design is not the only way to achieve suategyproofness. There are lots of literatures which use Nash equilibrium, a state at which no agent can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy when other agents keep their strategies. Since Nash equilibrium has a weak requirement for the strategies used by the agents, it often can achieve a wider variety of outcomes.
The main contributions of this paper are two-folded. First, we present a general framework about whether it is possible, and how if possible, to transform an existing multicast protocol to a strategyproof one. We then show how the payments to the relay agents are shared fairly among the receivers. As a running example, we show how to design a strategyproof multicast protocol, and how the payments are shared among recejvers when the least cost path tree is used for multicast. We also conduct extensive simulations to study the relations between payment and cost of the multicast structure. Our simulations show that by only overpaying a small amount to the relay nodes (or links), each relay node (or link) will declare its m e cost to maximize its profit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce some preliminaries, related works, our communication model, and the problems to be solved in Section 11. In Section III, we discuss the existence of truthful payment and how to find it if a given multicast structure is used. We show how to design a truthful multicast protocol based on a specific routing topology in Section IV. Several other important issues are discussed in Section V. The performance study of our proposed truthful core-based multicast protocol is presented in Section VI. We conclude our paper in Section VII.
TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES

A. Algorithmic Mechunism Design
In a standard model of algorithm mechanism design, there 
belongs to the VCG family if (1) the output U ( t ) computed based on the type vector t maximizes the objective function g ( o , t ) = C i w i ( t i ; o ) , and (2) the payment to agent i is 
B. Network Model and Problerrr Stalemen1
Consider any communication network G = (I< E, c), where V = { V I , 1 . I v,,] is the set of communication terminals, E = {el,e2r . . . >em} are the set of links. Every agent i in the network has a private cost ci to transmit a unit size of data, Here agents could be either terminals or links whoever could behave selfishly. If agents are terminals then G is node weighted; if agents are links then G is link weighted. Given a set of terminals Q = (41 I q2, . . . I q r } c V who are willing to receive the data, we will design a multicast protocol that 1) constructs a topology (a tree, a mesh, a ring, etc) that spans these receivers; 2) caIculates a payment for each relay agent according to a payment scheme that is strategy-proof;
3) charges each receiver according to a pricing scheme that is reasonable. We will formally define what is reasonable in subsection ITI-C. For the convenience of our analysis, we assume that s = qo is the source node in one specific multicast and the size of the data is normalized to 1. We also assume throughout this paper that agents in the network will not collude to improve their profits together. In order to prevent the monopoly, we assume the network is &connected.
One thing we should highlight here is that instead of reinventing the wheels by designing some new multicast structures, we focus on how we can design a truthful payment scheme for the existing multicast protocols to ensure that they work correctly even in non-cooperative networks. Eased on the truthful payment scheme we designed, we further study lrow we charge the receivers in a reasonable way. 
C. Relared Work
Routing has been part of the algorithmic meckanism-design from the very beginning. Nisan and Ronen [6] provided a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism for unicast routing in a centralized computational model. Each link e of the network is an agent and has a private cost te of sending a message. Their mechanism is essentially a VCG mechanism. The result in 161 is extended in [25] to deal with unicast problem for all pairs of terminals. They assume there is a traffic demand TL,j from a node i to a node j . They also gave a distributed method to compute the payment. Anderegg and Eidenbenz [26] recently proposed a similar routing protocol for wireless ad hoc networks based on VCG mechanism again.
In 1291, Wang and Li proposed an asymptotically optimum centralized method to compute the payment for unicast and showed that there is truthful mechanism that can prevent collusion.
For multicast, Feigenbaum et. a1 [23] assumed that there is a universal tree spanning all receivers and for every subset R of receivers, the spanning tree T ( R ) is merely a part of the universal tree induced by receiver set R. They also assumed that there is a publicly known link cost associated with each communication link and receiver qi will report a number w:, which is the amount of money he/she is willing to pay to receive the data, which may be different from its true privately known valuation wi. The source node then selects a subset R C Q of receivers according to some criteria. al. studied how to design suategyproof multicast protocols for various multicast trees when the relay terminals or links are selfish and the receivers will relay the data for peer receivers for free.
CHARACTERIZATION OF TRUTHFUL MULTICAST ROUTING
Several multicast topologies have been proposed and used in practice and it is expected that more topologies will be proposed in the near future, It will be difficult if not impossible to design a strategyproof multicast mechanism for each of . these topologies individually. Thus, instead of studying some specific multicast topologies. we present a general framework to decide whether there is. and how to design if it exits. a strategyproof mechanism for any given multicast topology. We also consider how to charge the receivers to cover the total payments to the relay agents.
Intuitively, we may still want to use the VCG payment schemes for these multicast topologies. Notice that an output function of a VCG mechanism is required to maximize the total valuations of agents. This makes the mechanism computationally intractable in many cases, e.g.. multicasi. Notice that replacing the optimal algorithm with non-optimal approximation usually leads to untruthful mechanisms [18] . Thus a mechanism other than VCG is needed when we cannot find the optimal solution or the objective is not to maximize the total valuations of all agents. This paper presents the first general framework to design strategyproof mechanism for multicast in which we cannot find the structure with minimum total cost.
A. Existence of rhe Tritllzfd Pavment Mechanism
Before we design some truthful payment scheme for a given multicast topology, we should decide whether such payment scheme exists or not. Following definition and theorem will present a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of the truthful payment scheme.
Definition 1: A method 0 computing a multicast topology satisfies the monotone property (MP) if for every agent i and fixed c -~, following condition is satisfied: If agent i is selected as a relay agent with cost ci2' then it is also selected with a smaller cost til.
Obviously, the above condition is equivalent to the following condition: There exisis a threshold value ~~( 0 . c + ) such that if i is selected as a relay agent, then its cost is at most
K~( O , C -~) .
For the convenience of our presentation, we use
Od(c) = 1 (respectively 0 ) to denote that agenl i is selected (respectively not selected) to the multicast topology when the cost vector is c.
Theorem 1: Given a method 6 computing a multicast topology, there exists a payment P such that M = ( 0 , P ) is strategyproof iff 0 satisfies monotone property.
Proof: We first prove if there exists a truthful payment based on 0 then 0 satisfies the monotone property. We prove it by contradiction by assuming there is a truthful payment scheme P based on 0 that does not satisfy MP. Consider a network with a cost vector cJic+, the utility for agent i when it reveals its true cost is ui(ce,) = pp. When agent i lies its cost to c i 2 , its utility becomes pt -cil . Since payment scheme P is truthful? we have py > p i -cz,.
Similarly we consider another network with a cost vector cliq2. Agent 2's utility is p i -ciP when it reveals its true cost. similarly, if it lies its cost to its utility is py. Since payment scheme P is truthful, pp < p i -G~.
Thus, we have pi' -ciz > pp > p l -til. This inequality implies that cil > cia: which is a contradiction.
We then prove that if U satisfies the monotone property then there exists a truthful payment based on 0. We prove it by constructing the following payment scheme P for a given a network G = (V, E , c ) .
Algorithm 1 Pavment Scheme P 1: For any agent i not selected to relay, its payment is 0.
2: For any agent i selected to relay. its payment is h i ( 0 , c-~).
From the definition of MP, the IR property is obvious. Thus we only need to prove that the payment scheme P satisfies IR. We prove it by cases. 
K~( C J , C -~) .
This ensures that agent i gets non-negative utility when it reveals its actual cost q. When i lies its cost to 5, it gets zero payment and zero utility. Therefore. agent i won't lie in this case.
Case 3: Agent 1: is not selected when it reveals its actual cost G ? and it lies its cost downward to Ei such that it is selected.
Similarly, we have ci 2 ~~( ( 7 , c -~) , which implies that agent i gets a non-positive utility. Comparing with the zero utility when agent i reveals its true cost. agent i also has no incentive to lie in this case. This finishes our proof. Actually. if we require that relay agents who are not selected should receive zero payment, our payment scheme illustrated by Algorithm 1 is the only strategy-proof payment scheme.
The proof is omitted here due to space limit.
B. Rules to Find the Truthful Paymenf Scheme
Given a multicast smcture satisfying MP, it seems quite simple to find a truthbl payment scheme by applying Algorithm l. However, sometimes h e process to find the threshold value in Algorithm 1 is far more complicated. As to our knowledge, our approach presented later is the first ever effort to find the threshold value efficiently. Instead of trying to give a unified approach that can find the threshold value for at1 multicast topologies satisfying MP, we present some usefuI techniques to find threshold value under certain circumstances. Our general approach works as follows. First, given an output method 6 that compuies a multicast structure, we decompose it into several simpler output methods, We then find the threshold value for each of the decomposed methods. Finally, we calculate the original threshold value by combining the threshold values for those decomposed methods.
Here, &%(U, CL*) is the threshold value for agent i when the multicast topology is computed by 0 and the costs c-, of all other agents are fixed. We then present a simple hut useful technique to find the threshold value. The proof of this theorem is quite simple and is omitted here. We will show how to use this simple combination technique in Section IV.
2 ) Round-based Meflrod: Many multicast topologies are constructed in a round-based manner: for each round they select some unselecred agents. update the problem and the cost profile if necessary. Following is a general characterization of a round-based method that constructs a multicast topology. 
1:
: Q initially.
Let 0' be a deterministic method that decides in round T whether agent i is selected or not. Update the network cost vector and receiver set. i.e., we obtain a new network cost vector ~(~~' 1 and receiver set Q(.+l) according to a update rule U':
5: until the desired property of the multicast topology is met 6: Return the union of the relay agents in all rounds as the final output. Here, every agent can be selected at most once.
To help the understanding of general round-based method. we present a multicast topology that is constructed in such way, The example we used is the polynomial time method in [ 151 that finds a multicast topoIogy whose cost is no more than 2 times of the minimum cost Steiner tree {MCST) In a link weight network. For the completeness of our presentation, we review their method here.
Here no receiver remains corresponds to the desired properties of general round-based method: LCP(s, qi, d) in round r corresponds to U'; updating cost of edges on LCP (3, qz, d ) to 0 and removing qz from Q is the update rule U'. Find one receiver in the receiver set Q. say qz, that is closest to the source s. i.e., the LCP(s,qi: d ) has the least cost among the shortest paths from s to all receivers. Connect q1 to the source s using the least cost path between them. Update the cost of all edges on this path as 0. Remove ql from the receiver set Q.
3:
4: until no receiver remains in the end of first round is shown in Figure 1 (b) . In the second round, the receiver set is &' = (411, and the least cost path from s to 91 is s1'3214V5Q1 instead of the least cost path sql in original network, The final multicast tree, shown as solid lines in Figure 1 . is the union of the two paths. Dejinition 2: An updating rule U' is said to be crossing- Theorem 3 presents a sufficient condition for the existence of uuthful payment scheme for a round-based multicast method. Following, we show how to find the threshold value for any selected agent k.
The proof of the correctness of this algorithm is omitted here due to the space limit, refer to the full version €or details.
independent if for any unselected agent i:
and Q('+') do not depend on 6 ' ' .
This finishes the proof. (a) The multicast tree (b) Payment for selected links We use the same network in Figure 1 to illustrate how to find the threshold value for edge 213714 based on the multicast tree found by Algorithm 3. In the first round, v3v4 can not be selected, thus = 0. In second round, it is easy to observe that when 7~3~4 ' s cost is smaller than 0.9, the path ZJ'3UqVgql is selected and when v p~q ' s cost is greater than 0.9, path sql is selected. Thus, the threshold value for vgv4 in this round is k ?~ = 0.9. Notice the updating by Algorithm 3 does not change the cost of an unselected agent, thus the final threshold value is simply the maximum of k'l and Ea, which is 0.9. In other words, we have to pay link w3v4 0.9. Similarly, we can find all selected edge's threshold value as shown in Figure 2 
C. Reasonable Charging Scheme
For a given set of receivers, after we calculate the payment p k ( d ) for every relay agent k based on a declared cost vector d, it is natural to ask who will pay these payments. Two possible payment models have been proposed in the literature. 1 j Outside bank or Group payment model: an outside bank or an organization to which the receivers belong will pay all these relay agents.
2 ) Payinen1 sharing model: each receiver i should pay a reasonable sharing S i of the total payment. We will address what reasonable means later. For outside bank model, the only thing we should care is how to find the uulhful payment scheme for the given multicast topology, which has been addressed in the previous subsections. In practice, it is often the case that the receivers have to share the payments among themselves. Thus, we will study how to share the payments fairly. Notice that the payment sharing is different from the traditional cost sharing. How to share the multicast cost among the receivers has been studied previously in [27] . [20] , [231. [Is] . in which the cost of relay agents are public and the multicast topology is a fixed tree. Most of the literatures used the Eqidaf Link Splzr Downstream (ELSD) pricing scheme to charge receivers: the cost of a link is shared equal& among all its downstream receivers. As we will show later. if we simply use the E%SD as our charging scheme to share the payment. it usually is not reasonable in common sense.
Given a set of receivers R, let P ( R , d ) = CI.pk (R, d ) denote the total payments to all relay agents. For a charging scheme S, let S, (R, d ) 
Cqa&i(R 4.
Notice the definition of reasonable can be changed due to different requirements. For example, a common criterion for mu1 ticast charging scheme is to maximize aemork wepare: select a subset of receivers such that the network welfare is maximized. Here, the rzemork wvlfare i s defined as the total valuations of all selected receivers minus Ihe cost of the network providing service. Since in our model we do not consider receiver's valuation, we will only focus on budget balance instead of maximizing the network welfare.
In literature, the Shapely value [28] is one of the most commonly used charging schemes to achieve BB and CM. By assuming a universal multicast tree and the publicly known link cos&, Feigenbaum et al. 1231 proved that ELSD charging scheme is a Shapely Value. Unfortunately, the ELSD charging scheme is not always fair if we want to share the payment. L e m m 4: For tree LST. ELSD sharing is not fair.
ProoJ As a running example, we will use the multicast tree, denoted by LST, found by Algorithm 3 to show that ELSD is not fair. We still use the same network shown in Figure I (a). Let Q = q1:qz be receivers. The multicast tree Figure 1 (c). Tree LST(ql) and LST(q2) are shown in Figure 3 We now show that ELSD is not fair in this situation. which is larger than its sharing Sl(q.1, c ) = 2.6 when 41 is the only receiver, Thus, it violates the property CM. It implies that ELSD is not a fair charging scheme for multicast topology
LST(Q) is shown in
LST.
Furthermore, using Ihe same example, we show by contradiction that there is no charging scheme satisfying both CM and BB.
Lemma 5: For multicast topology LST, there is no charging scheme that satisfies both CM and BB for a truthful payment scheme.
Prooj: For the sake of contradiction! we assume that a charging scheme S' satisfies both CM and BB. From the property of BB, we have S'l(g1, c ) = 2.6, S'l(q2, c) = 2.9 and S ' l ( q l u q 2 , c ) +S1z(q1Uq2,c) = 6.4. From CM, we have S' 1 (q1 U 92, c ) I 5'1 (41 I 4 = 2.6 and S'a (41 U 92, e ) 5 S'2jq2, c ) = 2.9. Combining these two inequalities, we obtain 6.4 = S'i(gi Uq2,~) f 5 ' 2 ( q 1 n q z ,~) 5 3.9 + 2.6 = 5.5, which is a contradiction.
Thus, given an arbitrary multicast topology and its corresponding truthful payment scheme, a fair charging scheme may not exist at all. It is attractive and important IO find the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair charging scheme for a given multicast topology.
IV. CASE STUDY: CORE-BASED MULTICAST
In this section, we illustrate how to design a truthful multicast protocol for the currently used core-based multicast which uses the least cost path tree (LCPT) as its topology. Here, we assume that the network is modelled as a link weighted graph. AH our results presented in this section also apply to the network modelled as a node weighted graph.
Given a set of receiver R, we first compute the Ieast cost path, denoted by LCP (s, qi, d ) , between the source s and every receiver qj E Q under the reported cost profile d. The union of all least cost psths between the source and the receivers is called least cosl put11 wee, denoted by LCPT( R, cl).
A. Paymenr Scheme
Intuitively, we may use the VCG payment scheme in conjunction with the LCPT tree structure as follows. 
In other words. the payment is its declared cost plus the difference between the cost of the least cost path tree without using el; and the cost of the least cost path tree. We show by example that the above payment scheme is not strategyproof. In other words, if we simply apply VCG scheme on LCPT. a link may have incentives to lie about its cost. Figure 4 illustrates such an example where link sv3 can lie its cost to improve its utility. The payment to link e3 = sv4 is 0 and its utility is also 0 if it reports its cost truthfully. The total payment to link e4 when e4 lies its cost down to 4 is w(LCPT(R, ~1~~0 ) ) -
w(LCPT(R, c~~&J,))+&
= 30-8+4 = 16 and the utility of link s'u4 becomes .u4(cI4d4) = 16-8 = 8, which is larger than q j c ) = 0. Thus link e4 has incentive to lie, which implies that VCG mechanism is not truthhl.
With the failure of the VCG mechanism. we may doubt whether there exists a truthful payment scheme based on LCPT. Remember LCPT is formed by union of least cost paths. By applying Theorem 2. we conclude that LCPT satisfies MP. Thus, there exists a truthful payment scheme and the truthful payment can be found according to Theorem 2 as following.
Far each receiver qi E R, we find the least cost path from the source s to qi. and compuie an intermediate payment p i ( d ) to link ek on LCP(s, qi, d ) using the VCG payment scheme for unicast
Here ILCP(s, qi,d) 
B. Distributed Payment Algorithm
Remember that LCPT is based on the union of the least cost paths from the source to all receivers. For unicast, Feigenbaum et at. [25] gave a distributed method such that each node i can compute a number pk. > 0, which is the payment to node k for carrying the transit traffic from node i 10 node j if node k i s on LCP(.z; j : d ) . The algorithm converges to a stable state after d' rounds, where d' is the maximum of diameters of graph G removing a node k, over all k. We then briefly discuss how to compute the payment for multicast using LCPT. Our distributed algorithm uses the algorithm in [25] as the first phase and is shown as follows. LGPT(q1,d) is shown in Figure 5 ( Figure 5 (c). If we apply ELSD to share payment, the payment to link sw~q (which is 6) is split equally between q1 and 42. Thus, the shared payment of receiver ql is 3 + 2 = 5 when the receiver set is {SI: sa), while its payment is only 4 when 41 is the only receiver, Thus, ELSD sharing method violates the CM property here. i.e., ELSD is not a fair charging scheme for LCPT. Therefore we should find some reasonable charging scheme other than ELSD. In this paper, we give one fair payment sharing method. The basic Idea behifld our method is that a receiver should only pay a proportion of the payment that is due to its existence. Roughly speaking, our payment sharing scheme works as follows. Notice that a final payment to an agent j is the maximum of payments pi by a11 receivers. Since different receivers may have different value of payment to agent j , the final paymenl FJ should be shared prop art ion all^^ to their values. not equallv among them as cost-sharing. Figure IV -C illustrates the payment sharing scheme that follows. Withour . We then divide the payment p j into n portions: p:, is then equally shared among the last n -i+ I elements, which have the largest n -i + 1 payments to Sj.
We first illustrate how to charge the receiver q1 using Algorithm 6 for a network represented by Figure 5 . For link s~q , the two intermediate payments are = 2 and pz,, = 6. First, we obtain a rank of these receivers based on the intermediate payment (ql, qz) '. Then pi,, = 2 is equally split between q1 and 92 and -& = 4 is charged to qz alone. Thus, receiver 41 is charged 2 + 1 = 3 totally in LCPT(q1 U q 2 , d), which is smaller than the price 4 when q1 is the only receiver. This shows that charging scheme described by Algorithm 6 is reasonable for this specific network. Following theorem shows that it is reasonable for LCFT generally. fieorem 6: The charging scheme defined in Algorithm 6 for LCPT satisfies NNS, CM, NFR and BB.
Proof: A link is called an upstream link of a receiver pi if it is on the unique simple path between the source and the receiver qi in the multicast tree. Obviously, our charging scheme satisfies NNS since p z r ( d ) -p:"-'(d) 2 o for any two receivers qgz and qOrpl. Remember for a receiver qua E R(ek), its sharing of the payment to its upstream link ea is: Algorithm 6 Fair charging scheme for LCPT. 
5:
In other word, For two receivers qu,, qut+l who are consecutive in ranking U , the difference pz""(d) -p z = ( d ) is shared by all receivers who rank after qu,-, .
6: end for 7: The total charge for receiver qi in LCPT is
Thus, the total charge to receiver qoQ is It implies that the charging scheme 6 satisfies NFR.
Summing f)=(R) for a from I to I E l ( e k ) l , we obtain Thus, we obtain (R,d) This proves thal our charging scheme ( 6 ) satisfies BB.
We then show that our scheme does satisfy CM. Notice a necessary and sufficient condition for CM is that for any
Assume qt is ranked a in ranking when the receiver set is R. We prove it by discussing all possible cases: We assume that rhis is already available through our distributed payment computing method. In our distributed charge scheme, at every link e k we use h/lDk [i] to store the payment it and all its upstream agents will receive from the receiver qi. Our distributed charging scheme is implemented in a top-down fashion from the source to all receivers. If link e k has only one downstream receiver qi then ek simply sends the modified charge M D k to its downstream link. Every receiver qi will finally receive a charge which is equal to equation (3).
v. OTHER ISSUES AND OPEN QUESTIONS
As we mentioned early. this paper is the first step to explore the general network protocol design when relay agents are non-cooperative, There are many interesting and important issues that have been untouched and left for further study. We just list a few here.
Collusion: Throughout this paper, we assume all agents will not collude together to manipulate the protocol. It is interesting to study what will happen when agents will collude and how to find truthful mechanisms that are resistent to collusion. Our conjecture is that no truthful multicast protocol lhat can prevent the collusion from an initial work proved in [29] for unicast.
Distributed Computing: One thing we should notice is that these agents running the distributed algorithms are indeed noncooperative. How to ensure they implement the correcr distributed algorithm we designed also is an important question we have to consider.
Receiver Valuation: So far, we assume that the receivers will pay the fair amount of sharing of payment to receive data using multicast, In practice, each receiver often has a valuation to indicate how much it is willing to pay to receive the information. Receiver will choose to receive the information if and only if the charge is at most its valuation. Furthermore, receivers could also be non-couperatiw and selfish: each receiver will always maximize its profit by manipulating its reported valuation. This makes the multicast design even harder and it is a very promising and interesting future research direction. It is weil-known that a cross-monotone cost sharing scheme implies a gro~p-xmtegypfouj mechanism [27] . Unfortunately, we can show that the simple application of a cross-monotone paymenr-sharing mechanism does not imply a group-strategyproof mechanism at all. The selfish relay agents could lie up or downward its cost to improve its utility.
VI. PERFORMANCE STUDY
We conduct extensive simulations to study the performance of strategy-proof multicast routing based on LCPT. Remember that the payment of LCPT is at least the actual cost of LCPT.
For a LCPT T . let c ( T ) be its cost and P ( T ) be the total payment to all relay agents. We define the overpayment ratio (OR) of T as
14)
In the worst case, the ratio ORIT) could be as large as O ( n ) for a network of n nodes [30] : even for the unicast special case. Notice there are some other definitions about overpayment ratio in the literature. In [30] , the authors proposed to compare the total payment P ( T ) with the cost of the new LCPT obtained from the graph G\T, i.e., removing T from the original graph G.
In addition to the overpayment ratio, we propose another metric to measure the performance of the suategy-proof multicast based on LCPT. Remember that the payments to reIay agents are shared among receivers. Thus, for each receiver, it is more interested in how much extra il should pay to guarantee the truthfulness of the links. Given the LCPT T for a set of receivers R, let ntp(R,T) be the price that receiver qz is charged to receive the information if the links are cooperative.
Notice that S,(R, T ) is the amount that receiver qz is charged to receive the data if the links are non-cooperative. We define the Price-Cost-Ratio (PCR) as
In our experiment? we generate random networks with n, nodes. where 71 is a parameter. In order to ensure the network is bi-connected. the average node degree should be greater than logn with high probability. First. for every node U , we randomly draw a number from lalog n: 5alogn] as its degree d.u, where N 2 1 is a parameter. A random graph satisfying lhese degree requirement is then generated. The length of each edge is then uniformly drawn from disuiburion 130: 1001: By choosing different parameters, we study what aspects of the network affect the OR and PCR. To compute the probability distribution. we generate lo4 different networks and compute the number of instances h a t fall in some specific intervals. For other simulations, given all fixed parameters, we generate lo3 different network instances and computes the performances accordingly.
A. Effect of Network Size
In this simulation, we fix the parameter a to e, which means that node' degrees are drawn from a uniform distribution 19) with average 20. We also fix the size of receiver set R to 15. We measure the performances of our suategyproof multicast protocol based on the following four meuics: Average Overpayment Ratio ( AOR), Maximum Overpayment. Ratio (MOR), Average Price-Cost-Ratio (APCR) and Maximum Price-Cost-Ratio (MPCR). MOR and APCR do not change when the number of network nodes grows from 100 to 500. On the other hand, MPCR fluctuates and is much larger than the other three metrics. Thus, we conclude that the number of nodes do not affect the overpayment ratio and price-cost-ratio in random network.
B. ESfect of Network Density
Since the difference in the network size do not affect the performances of our strategy-proof protocol, we then study other effects by fixing the network size (100 in the results reported here). We specifically study the effect of the network density by changing the node degree parameter a. Figure 8 (a) and (b) show the distributions of AOR and APCR respectively when the node degrees are drawn from two uniform distributions [log 100,5 log 1001 and [Z log 100,lO log 1001. Figure 8 (c) shows that the AOR, MOR and APCR change when the network density changes. It is interesting to observe that both AOR and APCR first decrease when the network density (i.e., the average node degree) increases from 10 to 32, and then increase slightly when the network density increases from 30 to 42. They both become steady when the network density i s greater than 42 . It is interesting to analyze this phenomenon theore tically. 
C. Performance Comparison with Unicasr
In this simulation, we compare the average cost and payment per receiver in multicast based on LClT with those of unicast. We randomly generate n terminals where 12 varies from 100 to 500. The degree of each node is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution [log n, 5 log 4. For a specific network, we average the cost and payment for all receivers. Figure 9 (a) plots the cost and payment for multicast and unicast per receiver when the number of receiver is 15, while Figure 9 (b) shows the results when 10% of nodes are receivers. Observe that the average cost and payment per receiver for multicast based on LCPT is smaller than the average cost and payment per receiver for unicast respectively. Furthermore, under most of the cases, the payment per receiver for LCPT payment is even smaller than the cost per receiver for unicast. This ensures us that multicast not only saves the total resources, but also benefits the individual receiver even in se@& networks. We then vary the network size among 100: 200,300,400,500 and the number of receivers from 1 to 30. Figure 9 (c) shows the unicast cost (the red surface) and the LCPT based multicast payment (the blue surface).
From the results of previous three simulations, we observe that AOR and APCR are both quite small for a random network? and even the MOR is smaller than 1.7 generally. Thus, we conclude that the theoretical worst case almost surely will not happen in a random network.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we give a strategyproof payment and charging mechanism that stimulates cooperation for multicast in a selfish network. We assumed that a group of receivers is willing to pay to receive the data. Each possible relay agent has a privately known cost of providing the relay service. In a multicast scheme, each selfish relay agent k first is asked to declare a cost for relaying data for other nodes., In return, it will get a payment based on the reported costs of all relay agents that can provide the service. The objective of every individual relay agent is then to maximize its profit. A multicast protocol is said to be strategyproof if no speculation and counter speculation happens. i.e., every relay agent will maximize its profit when it truthfully reports its cost.
It is well-known that the traditional protocols designed for conforming agents cannot prevent the selfish agents from manipulating its cost to its benefit. Instead of redesigning the wheels, it is preferred to enhance an existing multicast protocol to deal with selfish agents. In this paper, we specifically gave a general rule to decide whether it is possible, and how to if possible transform an existing multicast protocol to a strategyproof multicast protocol. We then showed how the payments to all the relay agents are shared fairly among all receivers so that it encourages collaboration among receivers. As a running example, we showed how to design a strategyproof multicast protocol when the least cost path tree is used for multicast. We (h) 10% nodes are receivers and payment per receiver for unicast and multicast also discussed in detail how to implement this scheme on each selfish node in a distributed manner. Extensive simulations have been conducted to study the relations between payment and cost of the multicast sructure, As all strategyproof mechanisms, the proposed scheme pays each relay agent more than its declared cost to prevent it from lying. Our extensive simulations showed that the overpayment is small when the cost of each agent is a random value between some range.
As we mentioned early, this paper is the first step to explore the general network protocol design when relay agents are non-cooperative. There are many interesting and important issues that have been untouched and left for further study, such as collusion, distributed computing of payments and charging.
